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406 PEOPLE BRIDGEIIOUSE C.2d 
as to the defendants Dewey Letsinger and Bert Metz the judg-
ment is modified by striking therefrom that portion in which 
the plaintiff is awarded $2,500 as and as 
so modified the judgment as to them is to 
recover costs on 
The petitions of Bert Metz and Dewey Letsinger for a 
rehearing vvere denied December 24, 1956. 
[Crim. No. 5913. In Bank. Nov. 30, 1956.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WIIJLIAlVI BRIDGEHOUSE, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Voluntary Manslaughter.-Voluntary manslaughter 
is a wilful act characterized by the presence of an intent to 
kill engendered by sufficient provocation and the absence of 
premeditation, deliberation and (by presumption of law) malice 
aforethought. 
[2] !d.-Voluntary Manslaughter.-To be sufficient to reduce a 
homicide to manslaughter, the heat of passion must be such 
as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinary, 
reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances, or 
in the mind of a person of ordinary self-control. 
[3] !d.-Voluntary Manslaughter-Provocation.-Where the evi-
dence showed that defendant's wife was having an affair with 
the deceased which extended over a considerable period of 
time, that she would neither approve of defendant commencing 
a divorce action nor forego seeing the deceased, that the sight 
of the deceased in his mother-in-law's home was a t,rr·eat shock 
to defendant who had not expected to see him there or any-
where else, and that defendant, a man of excellant character 
was then mentally and emotionally exhausted and was white 
and shaking, there was adequate provocation to provoke in 
the reasonable man such a heat of passion as would render an 
ordinary man of average disposition likely to act rashly or 
without due deliberation and reflection, so as to reduce the 
homicide committed by defendant to manslaughter. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 125; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 19. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Homicide,§ 22; [3] Homicide,§ 23; 
[4] Homicide, § 196; [5] Homicide, § 273. 
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[ 4] !d.-Instructions-Defenses-Unconsciousness.~ Where there 
was some evidence in a murder prosecution indicating that 
defendant was unconscious at the time of killing his wife's 
paramour, an instruction on such defense should have been 
[5] !d.-Appeal-Modification of Judgment.-vVhere the evidence 
is insufficient to support a judgment of second degree 
murder but is legally sufficient to support a judgment of 
manslaughter, the Supreme Court has the power under Pen. 
Code, § 1181, to reduce the degree of the crime from second 
degree murder to that of manslaughter. 
APPE.A.L from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Joe 
Raycraft, Judge. Modified and cause remanded with directions. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of second 
degree murder modified, and cause remanded to trial court 
with directions to enter judgment against defendant for man-
slaughter. 
Eugene V. McPherson and Gladys Towles Root for Ap-
pellant. 
Edmund G. Browu, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Miller, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant, William Bridgehouse was con-
victed, after trial by jury, of second degree murder of William 
Bahr. His plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was tried, 
by stipulation, by the court and he was adjudged sane both 
presently and at the time of the commission of the crime. The 
appeal is from the judgment of conviction and the denial of 
his motion for a new trial. 
Defendant who was 31 years of age, married Marylou 
Bridgehouse in 1951. At the time of the crime, they had a 
son, Danny, who was 2% years old. 1\<Irs. Bridgehouse had 
a son by a prior marriage who, at the time of the crime, was 
6¥2 years of age. At some time early in 1954, defendant met 
the deceased who was a part time bartender as well as a com-
mercial fisherman and an engineer on construction work. 
Mrs. Bridgehouse had known Bahr for more than six years. 
After defendant met Bahr, he and his wife had discussed her 
relations with him for a period of "well over a year." Mrs. 
Bridgehouse told defendant that she was having a love affair 
house home. 
told him that 
and other places. 
he had moved into 
in San Pedro 
The defendant :filed a suit for divorce from his wife in 
October, 1954. On 4, 1955, he filed an application 
for a order Mrs. Bridgehouse from 
or cohabiting with Bahr in the presence of 
minor child. 'rhis ,,·as served on Mrs. Bridge-
7th. About 7th, defendant re-
signed from the sheriff's department. On the same day he 
his gun, which he had bought as a service weapon while 
with the sheriff's out of hock and loaded it in 
the pawn shop with the intention of selling it. On January 
7th, after having been served with the restraining order, Mrs. 
Bridgehouse telephoned defendant asking him to see her in 
San Pedro. Defendant went to San Pedro, arriving there at 
approximately 10 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. When 
he reached the family home, he slept for a couple of hours. 
When he awoke, Mrs. Bridgehouse told him that she would 
:fight his divorce action and would not hesitate to lie or use 
any other methods in so doing; that she would kill him if he 
tried to take the children away from her. During this dis-
cussion, defendant apparently gave his wife, at her request, 
two or three months to think things over and decide whether 
or not she wanted him or Bahr. After this discussion, de-
fendant left the house and went to Manhattan Beach return-
ing to his wife's home between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening. 
Mrs. Bridgehouse was not there at the time but returned 
with the children sometime after 9 p. m. Defendant spent the 
night there, and the next morning Mrs. Bridgehouse at de-
''service 
where it vnw 
shop he had 
that when he 
410 PEOPLE BRIDGBHOUSE C.2d 
not it in the car because of 
would not fit in the 
when he went to the Huff house he was ''Tired. 
tired. to the of exhaustion.'' 
mother-in-law said he looked as if he had been 
hard and that was an<l she would 
He said that he then walked to 
and that "It is , but T believe 
him, and is my reeollretion that at that time that I wanted 
to discuss my the action that I was 
and that I wanted to it over with and 
and talk it out with him"; tl1at he had no 
idea \vhere Bahr \Yas or that he was there until he saw 
him; that he seemed "to have a very vague memory of him 
springing from the coneh"; that "As nrar as I ran possibly 
reeonstruct in my mind, the next I remember vvas 
pulling the trigger on empty cartridges"; that "The whole 
aetion was of sueh an explosive nature, yon say, and 
so distorted by a haze of mental void, you might say, that a 
detailed remembranee of the whole action are '; that 
he believed he next walked into the kitchen, but didn't know 
how much later it was; that while being questioned by the 
officers "It is yery difficult to recall. AU I knew was that 
I was in considerable pain at the time. I had a deal of 
difficulty in replying to the questions ... as I remember, it 
r the pain] was in the region of the solar plexus or in the 
thoracic or chest region"; that he had never had any pains 
like that before; that many times in the past he had been so 
fatigued he had not been able to speak rationally. The officer 
who questioned him after the crime wai'i committed, said he 
found defendant sitting at the kitehen table with his head 
in his hands; that he sermed to be in pain and upset; that he 
had difficulty in speaking and that his voiee seemed to rome in 
sort of a "gasp." Shortly after the crime, the defendant 
made the following statement to a police officer: ''About this 
time I thought that I would tell Mr. Bahr what I wanted 
to tell him for a long time, that I didn't want him around my 
children, and I was really going to tell him off. I went out 
of the bedroom [belonging to Mrs. Huff] and across the living 
room to where Mr. Bahr vvas sitting on the divan. He looked 
up or started to stand up. I really don't remember what. 
~<\.s I stood in front of him, there >vas a table between us. 
T don't remember if I said anything or not before taking 
tbe gun out of my belt and shooting. I don't adua lly nwal1 
411 
303 P.2d 1018] 
remember is that I realized my 
vHvL"HS on vW'fJLLv0 
defendant's showed that his mother had 
been committed to Camarillo State ; that he still 
loved his wife and wanted her to up Bahr and live with 
him and children and that he the for 
and the order to show eause foree her to ehoose 
him leave Bahr. The record also showed that defendant's 
wife and Bahr had a joint bank account which was known to 
defendant that one of defendant's eharge accounts had been 
used to a for Bahr; that defendant had found Bahr's 
hanging in the closets of his home; that he had paid 
the entire support of his wife's son by her former marriage; 
that he thought of the child as his own son and treated him 
in the same way as he did his own son; that the ehild thought 
he was his father and ealled him "Daddy." He testified that 
he resigned his job in the sheriff's department because he felt 
the position was ''detrimental to my family, and secondarily 
very detrimental to my health'' since he was worn out 
physically; that he had tried many times to get Mrs. Bridge-
house to go to a marriage counselor in order to work out their 
difficulties. He testified that his wife had had a very un-
happy childhood and unfortunate first marriage and that her 
emotional disturbances were caused thereby; that she didn't 
seem to want to lose him, nor did she want to give up Bahr. 
When defendant was asked what his feeling was concerning 
Bahr, he answered: ''I tried very much to make a non-entity 
out of him in my own mind, in my mind's eye. I knew from 
various sources that he was not the kind of person whom I 
could consider an upright, solid citizen. I knew that you 
can't force an adult to do something or not to do something 
against their will. I had to leave the decision up to Mary, 
and, yet, as I say, I also had my duty and my sacred oath 
[his marriage and my regard for my children to con-
sider." 
During the trial defendant was asked what his emotions 
were when he saw Bahr in his mother-in-law's home. He 
said: "It is a very difficult thing to describe. I recall trying 
to discuss it. I believe it was with Officer Butts during one 
of our interrogations. It was a feeling of great shock He 
was living in my mother's house, or in my mother-in-law's 
house or that she was virtually aeting as a panderer you might 
say, and that the dreadful situation had gone as far as it had.'' 
He also said that his pallor and shakiness might have come 
taken in 
what he had uee1cteu 
asked of him 
trial that he 
classes: ... 
''Five. Persons who committed the 
scions thereof. . . . " 




case har, was no maliee 
; there was no of 
ied; there was no evidenee of an "abandoned 
heart.'' There was 
eYidetJei' that d(•ft>ml<mt \ras CXl·Pllent r·hu raetl'l'; 
that and was 
white It appearR to ns, as of law, that 
under the circumstances there was 
to in the reasonable man such a heat of 
passiOn as would render an ordinary man of average dis-
position to aet rm;;hly or without due deliberation and 
refleetion Y. Lowrn, 175 Cal. 49 [164 P. 1121]). 
[4] \Ve are not unaware of defendant's second contention 
that although he offered four instructions on the effect 
of uneonsciousness* which he relied upon as a defense no such 
instruction >vas An instruction on that subject should 
have been [5] As this court said in People v. Kelley, 
supra, "\Yere ·we eompellecl, as to either affirm the 
judgment or reverse the case, we would be driven to the latter 
course'' because of: this prejudieial error. we have 
eoneluded that we must exereise the power conferred upon us 
by section 1181 of the Penal Code and reduce the of 
the crime from sreonc1 dPgrt•(; mnr<kr to that of manslaughter 
v. Kelley, supra; 211 Cal. 322 
[295 P. 333, 7l A.I..~.R 1385] ; People v. La Fleur, 42 Cal. 
App.2d 50 [108 P.2<1 v. 37 Ca1.App.2d 
311 [99 P.2cl 374] ; 60 Cal.App.2d 358 1140 
P.2d 846]; People v. Daniel, 6!') Cal.App.2d 622 1151 P.211 
275]; People v. Ross, :34 Cal.App.2d 574 [93 P.2c1 1019]; 
People v. Moreno, 6 Ca1.2d 480 1:)8 P.2d 6291 ; People v. 
Holt., 25 Cal.2d 59 [153 P.2d 21]; v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 
72 [207 P.2d 51]). 
We conclude, therefore, that the evidence legally insnf:fi-
<;ient to snpport a judgment of second murder hut that 
it is legally sufficient to a judgment of manslaughter. 
The judgment of the trial eourt of second murder 
is modified and the cause remanded to the trial court with 
directions to enter judgment against defendant finding him 
of manslaughter and thereupon to pronounce judgment 
upon him as prescribed by law. 
C. and Schauer, concurred. 
"Penal Code, section 26, snhrlh·ision :>. 
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upon the author-
P. 609] .) The cited 
distinguishable. From the summary of the 
it appears that there was 
evidence here from which the jury could infer that de-
fendant had a definite motive for his that he 
had made preparation for such killing, and that 
the was thereafter accomplished with "malice afore-
thought" and at the first opportunity. (Pen. Code, § 187.) 
There was no comparable evidence in the Kelley case to sup-
port any one of the above-mentioned inferences. I am there-
fore of the view that the Kelley case is not controlling, and 
that the evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain the con-
viction of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, 187, 189.) 
In fact, said evidence appears to be sufficient to sustain an 
inference that defendant's act constituted a "willful, de-
liberate, and premeditated killing," but these elements are 
only required in sustaining a conviction of first degree as dis-
tinguished from second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 189.) 
With respect to the alleged error in the failure of the trial 
court to give an instruction, l find no evidence to support 
the theory that defendant was unconscious at the time of the 
killing. Defendant was asked : "You believe that in your con· 
dition, as you were that Sunday morning, that you were ca-
pable of thinking correctly and rationally?'' He testified in 
reply: "I thought so at the time. I rather doubt it now." 
While defendant professed at the trial to be somewhat hazy 
in his recollection concerning the events of the morning of the 
killing, he did not testify at any time that he was unconscious 
at the time of the kil1ing. If, however, there conld be found 
any basis for the majority's conclusion that the evidence was 
such as to require an instruction on the subject of unconscious-
ness, then the majority should reverse rather than reduce the 
crime to manslaughter, as a person who does an act "without 
being conscious thereof" does not commit voluntary man-
slaughter or any other crime by the doing of such act. (Pen. 
Code, § 26, subd. 5.) 
I would affirm the judgment and the order denying a new 
trial. 
Shenk, J., and McComb, concurred. 
